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THE "COMFORT WOMEN" CASE: JUDGMENT OF
APRIL 27, 1998, SHIMONOSEKI BRANCH, YAMAGUCHI
PREFECTURAL COURT, JAPANt
Translated by Taihei Okada$
Abstract: The Court found in favor of three Korean "Comfort Women" plaintiffs
awarding monetary damages from the Defendant Japan for failure to pass legislation
redressing the acknowledged harm caused to the "Comfort Women." The Court
dismissed demands for an official apology and the claims of forced female laborers.
JUDGMENT'
This court hereby issues the following judgment on the Plaintiffs' 2
claim for an official apology and compensation for "Comfort Women 3 and
female Teishintai forced laborers from the city of Pusan, and an official
apology and compensation for all female Teishintai forced laborers and
"Comfort Women," based on proceedings in this court concluding
September 29, 1997.
Issued and published on the same day by Miyaji Toshie, clerk of the court.
Freelance Translator in Japan; B.A. in Philosophy/English, Northern Arizona University, 1994.
4th year of Heisei (1992), "Wa" No. 349 [hereinafter "Ko Incident"]; 5th year of Heisei (1993),
"Wa" No. 373 [hereinafter "Otsu Incident"]; 6th year of Heisei (1994), "Wa" No. 51 [hereinafter "Hei
Incident"].
2 Ko Incident Plaintiffs: Ha Sun-nyo, Choryang-dong 912, Tong-ku, Kwangyeo-shi, Pusan, South
Korea; Park Tu-ri, Myoungyung-dong My 1st District 33-34, Chonglo-ku, Teukbyul-shi, Seoul, South
Korea; Yu Chan-i, Sajik-dong Sa159-3, Tonglae-ku, Kwangyeo-shi, Pusan, South Korea; and Park So-duk,
Changil-dong 45, Tobong-ku, Teukbyul-shi, Seoul, South Korea.
Otsu Incident Plaintiffs: Park Sun-bok, Tongtong-li 943-1, Sunnyeong-chon, Sunnyeong-gun,
Kyeongsangnamdo, South Korea; Lee Yong-son, Onchen-dong 1550, Tonglae-ku, Kwangyeok-shi, Pusan,
South Korea; Kang Yong-jyu, Pyeoksan Apt. 105-508, Kaegeum-dong, Pusanjin-ku, Kwangyeok-shi, Pusan,
South Korea; Chong Su-ryon, Chugong Apt. 69-204, Hwamyoung-dong 89812, Puk-ku, Kwangyeok-shi,
Pusan, South Korea; Lee Sun-dok, Maeul-dong 230, Kwangsan-ku, Kwangyeok-shi, Kwangju, South Korea.
Hei Incident Plaintiff: Yang Kum-dok, Yang-dong 321-8, Seo-ku, Kwangyeok-shi, Kwangju, South
Korea.
Attomeys for the Plaintiffs: Yamazaki Yoshio, Lee Bak-sung, Yamamoto Seita, Matumoto Yasuyuki,
Fukushima Takeshi, Fujita Masato, Tokunaga Ryouji, Katami Fujio, Mizuno Akiko, Yoshino Chizuko, Lee
Woo-hae.
In this written judgment, the plaintiffs will not be differentiated by incident or claim. They will be
referred to simply as Plaintiffs.
3 Editor's Note: Throughout the case, the term "Comfort Women" remains in quotations in order to
avoid full acceptance of this Japanese euphemism.
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MAIN TEXT
I. The Defendant' must pay Plaintiffs Ha Sun-nyo, Park Tu-ri, and Lee
Sun-dok 300 thousand yen and five percent interest on the judgment from
September 1, 1992, until payment is complete.
II. Other claims by the aforementioned Plaintiffs and demands by other
Plaintiffs are dismissed.
III. Litigation expenses for the Plaintiffs prevailing in I. above, shall be
divided into thirds: Plaintiffs shall pay one third, the Defendant shall pay
two thirds. The Defendant shall pay its own expenses in entirety. All other
litigation expenses shall be paid by the party incurring those expenses.
BACKGROUND
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
A. Plaintiffs' Requested Relief
Plaintiffs request:
1) That the Defendant officially apologize in the Japanese Diet as
well as at the General Assembly of the United Nations for the suffering the
Defendant inflicted upon the Plaintiffs and other Korean "Comfort
Women," for the suffering resulting from Imperial Japan's annexation of the
Korean Peninsula, for Imperial Japan's mobilization of the Korean people in
World War II, and for Japan's lack of reparation after the war;
2) That Defendant pay to Plaintiffs Ha Sun-nyo, Park Tu-ri and Lee
Sun-dok 110 million yen each; to Plaintiffs Yu Chan-i, Park So-duk, Park
Sun-bok, Lee Yong-son, Kang Yong-jyu, Chong Su-ryon, and Yang Kum-
dok thirty-three million yen each plus five percent interest on the awards
from February 23, 1993 until payment is complete to Ha Sun-nyo, Park Tu-
ri, Yu Chan-i, and Park So-duk; from March 8, 1994 until payment is
4 Ko, Otsu and Hei Incidents defendant: Japan.
Defendant's representative: Minister of Justice Shimoinaba Koukichi, Kasumigaseki I - I - 1, Chiyoda-
ward, Tokyo, Japan.
Attorneys for the Defendant: Nagai Koulchi, Naito Hiroyuki, Koyama Minoru, Takasaka Megumi,Saito Toshihide, Fujii Toshinori, Fujii Takahiro, Takimura Takeshi. Special attorneys for Ko and Hei
Incidents, Karnimura Masanichi, Ishikawa Takeashi, Matsuda Shingo.
VOL. 8 No. I
"COMFORT WOMEN" CASE
complete to Park Sun-bok, Lee Yong-son, Kang Yong-jyu, Chong Su-ryon,
and Lee Sun-dok; and from April 19, 1994 until payment is complete to
Yang Kum-dok;
3) As an alternative to demand 2), that the Defendant pay Plaintiffs
Ha Sun-nyo, Plaintiff Park Tu-ri, and Plaintiff Lee Sun-dok one million yen
plus five percent interest on the judgment from June 21, 1994 until the
payment is complete;
4) That the Defendant pay all litigation expenses;
5) Declaration of provisional execution for demands 2) and 3).
B. Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Claims
1) All of Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed.
2) All litigation expenses should be paid by the Plaintiffs.
3) Declaration of a conditional security waiver.
II. BASIS OF PLAINTIFFS' BASIC CLAIMS
A. Plaintiffs'Assertions Against the Defendant
During Imperial Japan's occupation of the Korean Peninsula from
1937 to 1945, Korean Plaintiffs Ha Sun-nyo, Park Tu-ri and Lee Sun-dok
(hereinafter "Comfort Women" Plaintiffs) were taken by force to comfort
stations in such places as Shanghai and Taiwan and forced to have sexual
intercourse with numerous soldiers for an extended period of time.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs Yu Chan-i, Park So-duk, Park Sun-bok, Lee Yong-
son, Kang Yong-jyu, Chong Su-ryon, and Yang Kum-dok (hereinafter
Teishintai Plaintiffs)-all of whom are Korean-were brought to Japan by
force to perform hard physical labor as member of the Teishintai labor force
at war-related factories, such as the Fujikoshi Industrial Engineering, Inc.
factory in Toyama.
1) These incidents are covered by the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the
Potsdam Declaration of 1945, and the Japanese Constitution, specifically
the Preamble and Article 9, interpreted to impose a "duty of a moral state"
on the Defendant. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the Japanese
Constitution imposes a duty on Japan to officially apologize and provide
compensation to the victims of Imperial Japan's invasive war and
colonization. The Plaintiffs demand that, in accordance with the indirect
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application of the State Liability Act (Article 1, Section 1 and Article 4) and
the Civil Law Act (Article 723), the Defendant officially apologize at the
National Diet and at the General Assembly of the United Nations
(hereinafter "official apology"). The Plaintiffs also demand that the
Defendant pay compensation (100 million yen to each "Comfort Woman"
Plaintiff and 30 million yen to each Teishintai Plaintiff plus interest for
delay from the day after the appeal was received).
2) If demand 1) is denied, the following alternative is asserted:
Similar to Article 29 of the Japanese Constitution, Article 27 of the
Constitution of Imperial Japan (hereinafter "Meiji Constitution") should be
interpreted to require compensation for the damage caused by the violation
of freedom of life. Accordingly, the court should recognize that the
Plaintiffs suffered a special kind of damage because Imperial Japan's
invasion and occupation of Korea violated their rights as Koreans. The
Plaintiffs demand that, based on Article 27 of the Meiji Constitution, the
Defendant pay compensation (in the amount of demand 1)).
3) If demands 1) and 2) are denied, the following alternative is
asserted:
Based upon the Japanese Constitution, 5 Defendant Diet members are
clearly required to legislate a law providing compensation to war victims.
However, in the fifty years since the end of World War II and the Sino-
Japanese War, Defendant National Diet members have failed to do so. The
Plaintiffs correctly contend that more than enough time has passed in which
to establish the law. The Plaintiffs also demand compensation for the
failure to legislate a necessary law as prescribed in Article 1, Section 1 and
Article 4 of the State Liability Act, and by Article 723 of the Civil Law Act.
The Plaintiffs further demand that the Defendant officially apologize and
pay direct compensation (in the amount of demand 1)).
4) If demands 1) through 3) are denied, the following alternative is
asserted:
Both the Teishintai Plaintiffs and the Imperial Japanese Government
signed non-standard contracts, "the Teishin labor contract," (Kinro-
Teishintai-Keiyaku). These contracts stated that the Teishintai Plaintiffs
would join the Teishintai labor force and, as members of Teishintai labor
force, they would obey the command of Imperial Japan. These contracts
further provided that Imperial Japan would teach the Plaintiffs floral
Considering the Preamble, Article 9, Article 14, Article 17, Article 29 Sections I and 3, Article
40, and Article 98 Section 2 of the Japanese Constitution.
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arrangement, tapestry, and the use of a sewing machine. Imperial Japan, by
contract, agreed to guarantee the safety of the Plaintiffs' lives while
working, and during all times so employed.
However, Imperial Japan not only failed to fulfill the contracts but
also forced the Teishintai Plaintiffs to work harder than men, put them in
miserable conditions by viciously scolding and beating them, endangered
their lives by placing them in the middle of air raids, and clearly harmed
them. The Plaintiffs alternatively demand lost benefits and that the
Defendant provide monetary compensation (in the amount of demand 1)).
B. Additional Claims Against the Defendant
Japan has repeatedly claimed that any legal obligation to provide
compensation to the Korean victims of forced labor, as well as to Korea,
was resolved completely and finally by the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1965. As
for the "Comfort Women" issue, the Defendant responds, "There were some
private agents who assembled such people and they followed wherever the
armed forces went."
Referring to comments by Defendant's High-Ranking Government
Officials and specifically by Minister of Justice Nagano Shigeto (hereinafter
"former Minister of Justice Nagano") quoted in [the pleadings], the
Plaintiffs added the following demands:
1) Imperial Japan's colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula brought
great damage to the Korean people, including the Plaintiffs, and was
extremely inhumane and clearly criminal according to international law of
the time. Defendant Japan should have taken concrete measures to ensure
the aforementioned "duty of the moral state." Japan had a constitutional
obligation to stand on the victims' side. Namely, it should have tried to
lessen the suffering of the victims, establish war-related compensatory laws,
recognize Japan's legal obligation to provide compensation and to
investigate the extent of the damage Imperial Japan did to the Korean
people. Instead, the Defendant has consistently denied responsibility. It
refused to address the "Comfort Women" issues and denied its own
involvement.
Plaintiffs present their argument as follows. Defendant Japan's
actions described in [the pleadings] violate the "duty of the moral state" and
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hence are unconstitutional and illegal.6 Therefore, the Defendant must
officially apologize and pay compensation (ten million yen to each
"Comfort Woman" plaintiff and three million yen to each Teishintai
plaintiff, plus interest).
2) If demand 1) is denied, the following alternative is asserted:
As in demand 1), [the pleadings] show that former Minister of Justice
Nagano's comment in his April 28, 1994 inauguration speech violated the
law. A journalist from the Kyodo Tsushin Service asked former Minister of
Justice Nagano, "As a veteran, what do you think about Japan's war
responsibility including the 'Comfort Women' issues?" Former Minister of
Justice Nagano responded:
It was historically wrong for such a major country to impose its
own will on surrounding countries, in the middle of the
twentieth century. However, with differences in degree, the
system of 'Comfort Women' existed in the American and
British forces. It is cruel and unfair for the Japanese if we
determine that only the Japanese military did such things. The
"Comfort Women" were prostitutes of the day. We should not
look at it from the perspective of today. We cannot say that it
was discrimination against women or Koreans.
When this comment appeared in newspapers on May 4 and 5 of the same
year, it violated the dignity of the former "Comfort Women." The Plaintiffs
demand that, as prescribed by Article 1, Section 1 of the State Liability Act,
the Defendant pay one million yen plus interest.
III. [Noting attachment of pleadings]
REASONING
I. INTRODUCTION
1) The Plaintiffs in this case, former "Comfort Women," and
members of the Korean female Teishintai labor force, request an official
apology and compensation as part of war-related compensation for damage
6 As prescribed in Article 1, Section I and Article 4 of the State Liability Act and Article 723 of the
Civil Law Act.
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they suffered in Imperial Japan's invasion and subsequent colonization of
the Korean Peninsula.
2) The court will first give an overview of the reality of the "Comfort
Women" system and circumstances of the Korean female "Teishintai" labor
force. Then the court will examine the Plaintiffs' arguments. The Plaintiffs
have also submitted a considerable number of documents on historical
background in [the pleadings]. However, since this case can be resolved
without such historical background, the court will not consider the historical
background evidence.
II. FACTUAL ARGUMENTS
A. The History of the "Comfort Women" System
1. Asserted Facts
a) From 1932 to the end of World War II and the Sino-Japanese War,
comfort stations were widely established and there were many "Comfort
Women." Comfort stations were established upon the request of the armed
forces of the time. The largest group of foreign "Comfort Women" were
those from the Korean Peninsula. In the confusion after the defeat of the
Japanese armed forces, women including "Comfort Women" were left
behind.
It is believed that the first comfort station was established in 1932,
the year of the so-called Shanghai Incident. The comfort stations continued
to exist until the end of World War II. For the most part, private agents, at
the request of the armed forces, assembled women through deception and
threats and forced them to work, against their will, as "Comfort Women."
Furthermore, in a number of cases the military police took part in the actual
assembly of women. When an agent wanted to transport the women
overseas, the women were classified as civilian employees working for the
military, and the armed forces gave them permits to travel. The Imperial
Government issued identification cards for the "Comfort Women." In some
cases, the armed forces went so far as to allow the agents to use military
transportation, such as land vehicles and ships. In some areas, the armed
forces were directly involved in the management of the comfort stations.
Even where the armed forces were not involved with the creation of
the comfort stations, the armed forces determined the hours of operation and
JANUARY1999
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service fees, and established other regulations. The armed forces ordered
visitors to use contraceptive devices and took measures to have the military
doctors examine the "Comfort Women" regularly for venereal disease. In
some places, the armed forces allowed the "Comfort Women" to go out
only at certain hours to certain designated places. In some cases, the armed
forces divided open hours depending on the rank of a visitor.
b) Based upon the stipulated facts, the proposed arguments, and the
evidence, the Court finds the following:7
i) In many places, the armed forces requested establishment of the
comfort stations. Their original aim was to prevent anti-Japanese
sentiment, after Japanese soldiers in the Japanese-occupied territories had
raped a number of local women. The comfort stations were also established
to prevent deterioration of military strength due to venereal diseases, to
protect military secrets, and to prevent espionage activities.
ii) According to the research presented, the first confirmed comfort
station was established in Shanghai in 1932 to provide services to the unit
assigned to deal with the Shanghai Incident. After Imperial Japan entered
into full-scale war against China in 1937, comfort stations were established
in many regions of China. As the Chinese war-front expanded, so did the
number of comfort stations.
iii) The past existence of comfort stations has been confirmed in the
following countries and regions: Japan, China, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malay (presently Malaysia), Thailand, Burma (presently Myanmar), New
Guinea (presently Papua New Guinea), Hong Kong, Macao, and Indonesia.
There is no documentation, nor any reliable indication, of the total number
of "Comfort Women." Hence, it is extremely difficult to determine the total
number of "Comfort Women." However, given the extensive number of
regions with comfort stations, the number must have been large.
iv) Documents confirm that the "Comfort Women" came from Japan,
the Korean Peninsula, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Holland. Many of these "Comfort Women" were transported to the war
front. The largest number, after Japanese, came from the Korean Peninsula.
v) Although private agents ran most of the comfort stations, in some
regions, the Imperial Japanese forces directly managed the comfort stations.
Even if private agents ran the comfort stations, the Japanese Imperial Forces
7 Ko 2, Ko 14, Ko 15, Ko 25, Ko 26, Ko 27, Ko 30 and Ko32.
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influenced the management by setting the hours of operation, service fees,
and regulations for the comfort station management.
The Japanese Imperial Forces required customers to use contraceptive
devices, set sanitary guidelines, and had military doctors carry out regular
medical exams on "Comfort Women" for venereal diseases. In some of the
comfort stations, there were restrictions on when the "Comfort Women"
could go out. On the war front, the "Comfort Women" were always under
the surveillance of the armed forces and followed wherever the armed
forces went; their freedom was extremely limited. They were also forced to
live in miserable conditions.
vi) Upon the request of the armed forces, private agents assembled
"Comfort Women." As the war intensified, the need for "Comfort Women"
increased. Under these circumstances, the private agents began using
deception and threats in order to gather enough women. The military police
sometimes took part in gathering "Comfort Women."
vii) When agents needed to transport "Comfort Women," the
Japanese Imperial Forces issued identification cards and gave travelling
permits to the "Comfort Women" by classifying them as civilian employees
working for the military. Often the "Comfort Women" were transported by
military vehicles and ships. Some documents indicate that when the armed
forces were defeated, the "Comfort Women" were left behind.
2. Facts about the "Comfort Women" Plaintiffs
It is impossible to confirm with certainty the details in the personal
statements of each "Comfort Woman," specifically how the Plaintiffs were
forced to work as "Comfort Women," or the reality of the comfort station
situation in the absence of opposition evidence. This ambiguity is perhaps
due to the Plaintiffs' advanced age. We next will summarize the evidence
[in the pleadings], examine its probative value, and finally recognize as fact
that evidence we believe to be reasonably certain.
a. Testimony of Plaintiff Ha Sun-nyo
i) Plaintiff Ha Sun-nyo was born on February 2, 1918 in the city of
Mogpo, located in the Southern part of the Korean Peninsula. Her family
was poor. Her house was made of straw and had only two rooms. In 1937,
when she was nineteen, she was working as a live-in domestic worker for an
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owner of a clothing store. One day, when she went shopping, two men
spoke with her. One man was Japanese in western clothes and the other one
was Korean in traditional Korean clothes. They said, "You can make a
fortune. Don't you want to come with us?" Nineteen years old was a little
too old to get married at that time, and she wanted to make a lot of money
for her dowry. She trusted the men and went with them. She was taken
from one of the Korean ports to Osaka. After staying in Osaka for a night,
she was taken to Shanghai.
ii) She was taken to a dormitory, with a sign which said "Army
Comfort Station," near the American or French quarters. The Japanese man
who induced her to come was the owner of the establishment. The
dormitory had about thirty rooms. There was no window in her room and it
was so small that two people barely could sleep in it. She thought that she
would do cooking and laundry in the room. But the day after she was
assigned her room, a Japanese man in a khaki army uniform came into her
room, he beat her and tried to strip her clothes away. She screamed and
tried to flee, but the door was locked and there was no way out.
iii) From the next day on, except during her menstrual period, from
9:00 A.M. to 2:00 A.M. the following day, she was forced to have sexual
intercourse with soldiers. The wife of the owner received money from the
soldiers, but the Plaintiff never received any. Since she did not want to
associate with soldiers, she sometimes went to do laundry and cooking for a
Chinese couple named "Cho." She pleaded with the owner to let her work
just as a laundry woman and cook, but every time she pleaded, she was
badly beaten. She still has scares from this physical abuse. One day, being
unable to put up with the situation any more, she tried to run away, but she
was caught, brought back to the establishment and beaten with a fifty
centimeter oak club. She was hit on the head and bled badly. Because of
this injury, she continues to suffer from severe headaches on rainy days and
occasional memory losses.
iv) After the war, the owner of the comfort station and the soldiers
left her in the establishment. She was afraid of Chinese vandals who were
destroying the buildings and setting them on fire, so she fled to the Cho's.
After being concealed by Cho's wife, she was taken to a wharf in Shanghai.
She camped there like a tramp and waited for a homebound ship for three
days. Eventually she was able to go back to Pusan and to her hometown.
Back in her hometown, her father had died of "fire sickness" caused by
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anger and grief. She told her mother that she had been working at an
officer's house in Shanghai as a cook and laundry woman.
v) Until she registered in the "Association to Deal With the Pusan
Teishintai Issues," she concealed.the fact that she had worked as a "Comfort
Woman." Only when she filed this suit, did she disclosed these facts with
her real name.
b. The Testimony of Park Tu-ri
i) Plaintiff Park Tu-ri was born near Pusan on September 2, 1924.
She was the eldest of seven children; she had three younger brothers and
three younger sisters. Her family was extremely poor and she thought that
she had to work in order to support her family. When she was seventeen,
three men came to her village to assemble young women. They told her, "If
you work at a factory in Japan, you can make a fortune." She thought it
would be nice to work at a factory, support her parents financially, and
eventually get married. She trusted the men and decided to go to the factory
in Japan. When she told her parents that she would like to go to Japan and
make a fortune, her parents naively approved. After that, she and ten other
young women were taken to Pusan, and from Pusan to Taiwan, by the man
who assembled them.
ii) After she was hospitalized due to intense seasickness, she was
taken to a comfort station. The man who induced her to come was the
owner of the comfort station. She was told to have sexual intercourse with a
client. She felt that she was cheated and considered running away. But, she
neither understood the language nor had anyone to rely on, so she stayed. It
was the first time she had slept with a man. After that, she was beaten and
raped many times. Since most of the clients were Japanese soldiers, it was
prohibited to speak Korean at the comfort station and those who violated the
rules were beaten. Her nickname was "Fujiko."
iii) She was forced to have sexual intercourse with ten men a day on
average. She had only one day-off a month, but even in her day-off, she
could not go outside freely. Food at the comfort station was very scarce and
she had no money to spend on food. Being very hungry, she stole bananas
from the nearby plantation. When this theft was discovered, she was
severely beaten by the plantation owner as well as the owner of the comfort
station. For five years in Taiwan, she did not receive any money from the
owner. The tips that she got from the clients were barely enough to keep
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herself clean. When she received a letter from her younger brother, she had
no money. He wrote that he wanted her to send him some money, so he
could buy stationary and go to school. Because she had no money, she felt
very miserable and began to cry. Seeing her cry, other young women at the
comfort station felt pity and donated money to her. She was then able to
send some money to her brother. Since she had to work as a "Comfort
Woman" for such a long time, she contracted a disease that made her thighs
swell and required surgery. Even now, she has these scars on her body.
iv) After the end of war, she was taken back to her hometown in
Korea by the Korean man who was the owner of the comfort station. She
told her parents a lie-that she was working at a factory in Taiwan. She
also told them that she did not receive any money. After that, she got
married and had children. However, she continued to hide her past as a
"Comfort Woman." When she filed this suit she used her real name,
disclosing her secret for the first time.
c. Testimony of Plaintiff Lee Sun-dok
i) Plaintiff Lee Sun-dok was born in the Southern part of the Korean
Peninsula on October 20, 1918. Because her parents were working away
from home, she was in charge of domestic affairs. One day in the Spring of
1937-when she eighteen years-old-she was picking some edible herbs for
dinner at a nearby rice-paddy. A middle aged Korean man spoke to her. He
said, "If you come with me, you won't have to pick any more herbs. You
will have shoes, clothes and plenty to eat." Since her family was so poor
that she did not have good shoes or much to eat, she decided to go with him.
She said to him, "I want to say good-bye to my parents," but he insisted,
"We don't have much time" and took her away by force. She was surprised
that he pulled her hand so hard and being embarrassed and frightened, she
could not help but follow his order. She was told to walk in front of him.
About an hour later, they arrived at an inn and she was told to stay in
a room. The room was locked from the outside and in it there were about
fourteen or fifteen women all about the same age as Plaintiff Lee Sun-dok.
Not knowing where they were going and why they were taken away, they
were all sobbing in fear. The next day, three Japanese soldiers in khaki
uniforms, with leggings and sabers, came to them and took them to
Shanghai station. It took three days by train. Then they were put in the
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cargo area of a truck-which did not have any roof-and taken to an
Imperial Army camp.
ii) Each woman, including Plaintiff Lee Sun-dok, was put in a small
hut built near a large army tent. The huts were simply built; the horizontal
roof was made of bush branches and the floor was made by using a khaki-
colored blanket and straw mat placed on top of a layer of dead leaves. It
was no bigger than two or three tatami mats (120 centimeters by 240
centimeters). When it rained, the rainwater seeped through the roof and
walls. Plaintiff Lee Sun-dok received shirts and trousers which were the
same color as the army uniforms. For the first two days, she went through
blood tests and received a shot of something called "No. 606." From then
on, "No. 606" was administered to her once every two weeks.
iii) Four days after she was put in the army camp, a middle-aged
officer with three stars on the uniform, named "Miyazaki," came into the
hut. He forcefully tried to have sex with her. After she was incapacitated,
he raped her. This continued every night for three days. After this incident,
many soldiers lined up in front of the hut, and, one after another, raped her.
This continued for the next eight years until the day of liberation in August
of 1945. On average, starting at 9:00 A.M., she was forced to have sexual
intercourse with eight or nine soldiers on weekdays and seventeen or
eighteen on Sundays.
iv) In June or July of 1945, one of the soldiers accused her of
sleeping with other men. He kicked her in the abdomen and slashed her
back with a sword. After only one week of treatment, she was again forced
to have sexual intercourse. She still suffers from this injury. Even now, she
cannot walk because she gets dizzy spells and feels a pain in her chest on
rainy days.
v) After Japan's defeat in 1945, the Japanese soldiers left the camp.
She traveled with a group of women like herself for several days in a cargo
train with no roof, chanting the slogan, "we are liberated, let's go home,"
finally arriving at her home village. When she returned her parents were
long dead and her younger brother lived with her aunt. Her parents died
from the grief for their missing daughter. She never told her younger
brother or two successive husbands about what happened to her. During her
two marriages, she never bore a child. When she went to an obstetrics
doctor, she discovered that her womb was deformed and she could no
longer bear a child.
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d Credibility of "Comfort Women" Plaintiffs' Testimonies
i) In a. through c. above, the details of how the Plaintiffs became
"Comfort Women" are not clear, and it is difficult to ascertain who the
owner of each comfort station was. Moreover, the location of each comfort
station is no more precise than a general area such as "near Shanghai" or
"Taiwan." The "Comfort Women" also do not explain how the comfort
stations were established and maintained. More importantly, they explain
neither the type of relationship the comfort station had with the Imperial
Forces, nor to which unit a certain comfort station rendered service.
However, given the fact that the "Comfort Women" Plaintiffs were
born to poverty-stricken families, have limited education, and are now in
advanced age, it is quite understandable that the testimonies are fragmented
and narrow in scope. Therefore, the lack of details does not impair the
credibility of the testimonies. Furthermore, considering the fact that they
had to hide the shameful experience for such a long time, and that the
"Comfort Women" Plaintiffs only revealed their experiences for the first
time in these proceedings, and that the present testimonies are of their
personal experience, the credibility is considered to be quite high. Since
there is no counter proof to any of this testimony, it is acceptable.
ii) Thus, the following assertions are generally taken as fact:
All of the "Comfort Women" Plaintiffs were brought to the comfort
stations through deception and forcefully turned into "Comfort Women" by
rape. The comfort stations had deep relations with the Imperial Japanese
Forces. Until the end of World War II and the Sino-Japanese War in
August 1945, the "Comfort Women" Plaintiffs were forced to continue to
have sexual intercourse, primarily with Japanese soldiers. From the time
that they went back to Korea until filing this case, they hid the fact that they
were "Comfort Women" and concealed these facts even from their close
family members.
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B. Conditions of the Korean Women's Teishintai Labor Force and
Specific Facts of the Teishintai Plaintiffs' Damages
1. Conditions of the Korean Female Teishintai Labor Force
a) According to [the pleadings], both parties stipulate to the following
facts:
The "Ordinance for female Teishintai labor force" (Imperial
Ordinance No. 519) (hereinafter "Ordinance") was issued on August 22,
1944 (Official Gazette, *August 23, 1944). Article 3, Clause 1 of the
Ordinance states, "Those women registered as Japanese nationals under the
'Ordinance for Labor-Skill Registration' should join the Teishintai labor
force." Article 3, Clause 2 of the Ordinance states, "In addition to the
aforementioned candidates, women must express their desire to become
Teishintai laborers." Article 4, Clause 1 of the Ordinance states "The
service term is one year with exceptions for special cases." Article 4,
Clause 2 of the Ordinance states, "the consent of the member must be given
if she continues to work after one year." In addition, the "War-Related
Incorporation Law" was issued on October 31, 1943; The Fujikoshi Iron
and Steel Industry Inc. existed from October 1, 1944 to August 31, 1945.
b) According to these stipulated facts, the testimonies and evidence,8
the following facts are recognized as true: 9
i) Beginning in 1937, the Imperial Japanese Government had to
expand its war-related production in order to fight the Sino-Japanese War
and suffered from a constant labor shortage. To overcome this shortage, it
issued the "National Mobilization Act" in April 1938 and the "Ordinance
for National Draft" in 1939. In Korea, the unified control of the "volunteer"
Korean labor force and the mobilization of the Koreans was planned. As
the war intensified, the "Ordinance for Labor Service to the Nation" was
issued in 1941 and the comprehensive mobilization of Japanese nationals
was further planned in 1942. In these circumstances, Korean women were
forced into the labor force in war-related industries. At the sub-cabinet
meeting in September 1943, it was decided that enhanced mobilization of
female labor would be further pursued.
Exhibits Ko 7, Ko 8, Ko9, Ko 18, Ko21, Ko22, Ko23, Ko24, and Ko 39.
9 It should be noted however, as written in page 125 of exhibit Ko 18, the shortage of documents
precludes a comprehensive understanding of the Korean women's Teishintai labor force.
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In order to "utilize the potential labor power of women" and to "put
potential female laborers into work," single women over the age of fourteen
were targeted. Through administrative orders and with the help of women's
groups, the Teishintai labor force was to be organized voluntarily. In
addition, at a cabinet meeting the same month, "enhancement of female
labor force mobilization" was included in the "special war-time policies."
In 1944, at the February cabinet meeting, the cabinet approved an outline
for the special war effort, "to open the way for enlistment of female laborers
into the female Teishintai labor force." In the next month, the cabinet
approved guidelines for a change in the female Teishintai labor force, and
made it possible to force women to join the Teishintai labor force if they
were registered as Japanese. To establish a legal basis for the Teishintai
labor force system in accordance with the "National Mobilization Act," the
"Ordinance of the female Teishintai labor force" was issued in March of
1945. However, in order to facilitate a more effective, unified, and
comprehensive mobilization, the "Ordinance of the female Teishintai labor
force" was subsumed into the "Ordinance for national labor force."
ii) The "Ordinance of the female Teishintai labor force" was applied
in the Korean Peninsula during the same period it was in effect in Japan. A
number of single Korean women were mobilized into the female Teishintai
labor force. The mobilization process started in 1941. The number of
mobilized women climbed sharply towards the end of the war. The women
were forced to work in various war-related factories, such as the Fujikoshi
Iron and Steel Industry Inc., Toyama factory (hereinafter "Fujikoshi
Toyama Factory"), the Tokyo Spinning Inc., Numazu factory (hereinafter
"Tokyo Numazu Factory"), and the Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Inc., Nagoya
Air Plane Department, Dotoku factory (hereinafter "Mitsubishi Dotoku
Factory").
Most of the mobilized women were in their mid-teens, had just
graduated from public schools, and were from major southern cities, such as
Incheon, Chon-ju, and Pusan. The primary agents for mobilization of these
students were their schools. The young Korean women were told by their
teachers, "You will be able to study, and the wages at the Teishintai labor
force will be good" and "Everyone in Korea will join anyway." They
trusted these words and joined the female Teishintai labor force, but there
were also a number of members who were forced to join involuntarily. In
principle, membership in the Teishintai labor force was voluntary, but since
it was "Kan Assen" (work prompted by the administration), each school had
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a numerical requirement as to how many "volunteers" each school needed
to recruit for the Teishintai labor force. Hence, for the schools that did not
have enough volunteers, the teacher prepared raffles or made an arbitrary
list and forced students to become volunteers.
iii) At the Fujikoshi Toyama Factory, Tokyo Numazu Factory, and
Mitsubishi Dotoku Factory, the young women were divided on the basis of
when and where they were mobilized and assigned to different dormitories.
In order to improve the productivity, the factory administration placed
"dormitory fathers" and "dormitory mothers" with the women and tried to
make the company like a family. The dormitory father was in control of the
affairs in the dormitory. The dormitory mother was responsible for the
daily lives of the members. The members had to obtain permits to go
outside and had to follow curfews.
The female Teishintai labor force had a military structure: the
members were divided into regiments and units, and regiment leaders and
unit leaders were chosen from the mobilized laborers. Their daily schedule
was in a military order. When they woke up, roll call was taken to make
sure that no one had run away. At the factory, under the surveillance of the
leader, they performed lathe work or painting. At that time, food was
scarce, they received very small amounts of staples and had only pickles to
eat them with. They were always hungry. As the war situation worsened,
they were subject to air raids, which frightened them very much. The fact
that they were living so far away from their families aggravated their fear.
At the Fujikoshi Toyama Factory alone, it is estimated that more than
1000 Koreans worked in the female Teishintai labor force. In March of
1945, the Ministry of War-Related Industries and the Japanese colonial
government in Korea ordered this factory to move to a place near
Pyongyang. The factory and 420 laborers moved in July, but was never put
into operation because of the end of World War II and the subsequent
liberation of Korea in August. The Tokyo Numazu Factory had
approximately 100 laborers. This factory was bombed and destroyed on
July 17, 1945, and its laborers were moved to the Fuji Spinning Inc.,
Koyama Factory. They were there when World War II ended and the
subsequent liberation finally came. The Mitsubishi Dotoku Factory was
estimated to have 300 laborers. Six died as a result of the To-Nankai
earthquake on December 7, 1944. Because of the earthquake and the air
raid that started on December 18, the laborers at this factory took refuge in
different parts of the country.
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Despite these horrible conditions, almost none of the female
Teishintai labor force members ever received any money. For most of
them, their income went directly to a bank account, but they never had
access to the account, even after the war.
2. Facts Regarding the Teishintai Plaintiffs' Damages
In accordance with the aforementioned facts, and considering the
testimonies and evidence,'" the following facts are recognized to be true.
Although these facts are recognized due to the Plaintiffs' testimonies, as
mentioned before, the details of the female Teishintai labor force are still
unclear, and among the testimonies there are some contradictions and
certain implications that are not logical. In addition, given the fact that
certain parts are identical among different testimonies, there is a possibility
that one testimony has influenced another. Hence, the court cannot
conclude that the testimonies are entirely true, even in the absence of clear
contradictory evidence. A basic aspect of discerning the credibility of these
statements requires consideration the tangled nature of emotions and reality.
Even so, there is no doubt that the testimonies are based on the real
experiences of the Plaintiffs and despite minor contradictions, they are
generally credible.
a. Testimony of Plaintiff Yu Chan-i, Plaintiff Park So-duk and Plaintiff
Park Sun-bok
i) Plaintiff Park Yu Chan-i was born in Masan, Korea, in 1928. Her
father died when she was young and she had been living with her mother
and three elder brothers. She went to the national public school until the
third grade. After that, she helped in her brother's grocery.
When she was sixteen, the Korean district leader visited her house
and showed her the photos of the factories, which a Japanese had brought to
him. He also showed female students working at the factory and arranging
flowers. While showing her these photos, he told her, "The pay in Japan
will be good and you will be able to study while working," "You can learn
floral arrangement and how to use a sewing machine," and he induced her to
" Ko 10 through Ko 13, Ko 16, Ko 17, Ko 20, Witness Sugiyama Tomi, Plaintiff Park So-duk,
Plaintiff Yu Chan-i, Plaintiff Park Sun-bok, Plaintiff Yang Kum-dok, Plaintiff Lee Yong-son and Plaintiff
Kang Yon-jyu.
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join the female Teishintai labor force. Since she heard that she would be
able to study and earn a lot of money, without asking what kind work she
would have to do or at which factory she would be working, she consented
to his offer.
In July of 1944, about fifty women between fourteen and sixteen
years-old gathered at the civic center of Masan. They were divided into
several groups depending on which area they came from and were taken to
Pusan by train, and from Pusan to Shimonoseki by ship. They were led by
Japanese. At Shimonoseki, a Japanese man-who later turned out to be
their boss at the dormitory-greeted them. Then they were taken to
Toyama by train and arrived at the Fujikoshi Toyama Factory.
ii) Plaintiff Park So-duk was born as the fifth among eight children in
her family. She graduated from the national school in March of 1944. In
May of the same year, she was called by her former teacher, Moriya, who
was Japanese. Moriya and another male teacher told her, "If you go to
Japan to work, you can learn floral arrangement and stitch work and you
can even go to school," "All the Japanese nationals have to be loyal to
Japan. You will have to go anyway. So the sooner the better" and "If you
did not like it there, you would be able to come back anytime." They tried
to induce her to join the female Teishintai labor force. She accepted the
offer, for she trusted Moriya and the offer sounded good. On the day of
departure, there were about forty-five women in the city square of
Kyeongsang-bokdo. The youngest was in the fourth year at the national
school while the oldest was two years older than Park So-duk. They took
the train from Daegu and arrived at Pusan in the evening. The next
morning, they went to Shimonoseki by ship. After staying at Shimonoseki
for one night, they went to the Fujikoshi Toyama Factory.
iii) Plaintiff Park Sun-bok was born as the second of three children,
on April 23, 1930 in the city of Chinju. When she was thirteen, either in the
autumn of 1943 or in the spring of 1944, she was told by her teacher,
Kageyama, "Don't you want to go to Japan? You will be able to study more
and learn the arts of floral arrangement," "The working conditions at the
factory are good and you can go to school while working," "You can learn
floral arrangement," and "Everyone has to go there anyway, so the sooner
the better." Her teacher induced her to join the female Teishintai labor
force. Since she trusted Kageyama and thought it was patriotic to render
service to the Emperor, she agreed to become a member of the female
Teishintai labor force.
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On the day of departure, at the Chinju station, there were about fifty
women. They were led by a Japanese who came from the Fujikoshi
Toyama Factory. They were taken to Pusan by train. At Pusan, they were
joined by a group of fifty women from Daegu and another group of fifty
women from Masan. Everyone was female and between the ages of thirteen
and twenty-three. They traveled from Pusan to Shimonoseki by ship and
from Shimonoseki to the Fujikoshi Toyama Factory by train.
iv) In the dormitory at the Fujikoshi Toyama Factory, they were
divided into groups of ten women depending on their hometown and were
assigned to live in the same room. Each room was about nine to eleven
square meters. They had to have permits to go outside and there were
guards at the gate. However, permits were allowed only if they had to go to
the hospital. They could not even go shopping. They had to deposit all the
money they had and could get it back only when they told the authority why
they needed it. Furthermore, the authority inspected the letters that they
wrote to their families; they had to show the letters to their boss before
putting them into envelopes.
v) Food was scarce at that time. Their meals reflected this. In
addition to a small amount of rice for each meal, they had miso soup for
breakfast, pickles for lunch and some meager dish for dinner. They never
had meat or fish. The members were always hungry.
According to Plaintiff Park So-duk, when they went to work, they
received three small pieces of bread for lunch. Nevertheless, she could not
wait until the lunch break. She ate the bread in the morning and during the
lunch break, she just had water. At the canteen, the mobilized Japanese
female students received about four-fifths of a lunch box of rice; the young
Korean women received only about halfa lunch box of rice.
vi) At the factory, they were lathe workers. According to Yu Chan-i,
two shifts alternated at the end of each week. For the day shift, they woke
up at 6:00 A.M., started to work at 7:00 A.M., and continued to work until
evening; for the night shift, they worked from 8:00 P.M. to dawn.
They had to stand while working. It was hard and dangerous. Their
legs often swelled, their fingers were almost chopped off, and their hands
were injured by discarded metal chips. Some of them were hospitalized and
even had to undergo surgery.
vii) As the war situation worsened, the Fujikoshi Toyama Factory
was subject to frequent air raids. The workers were very afraid of being
killed. They had to evacuate to a shelter, nearby shrine, or temple. Then
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the order to move the factory to the place near Pyongyang came. They
traveled from Toyama to a port in north Korea by ship." When they arrived
there, they were told to stay in their dorms. While they were waiting at
home, the end of World War II and the subsequent liberation came.
viii) The Plaintiffs did not receive any payment. They did not learn
flower arrangement, stitch work, or the use of a sewing machine, nor were
they allowed to study at school.
b. Testimony of Plaintiffs Lee Yong-son, Kang Yong-jyu, and Chong Su-
ryon
i) Plaintiff Lee Yong-son was bom as the third of six children on
April 21, 1931. When she was thirteen and a sixth-year student at the
national school in Pusan, her school principal and her teacher, Oka
Hidehiko told her:
[I]f you join the female Teishintai labor force and work at an
airplane factory in Japan, you can go to school and will earn a
lot of money. Eventually, every Korean woman has to go. If
you have to go anyway, you should be the first one to go. The
term is no more than two years.
This induced her to join the female Teishintai labor force. Although she did
not hear about the details, since she trusted her teacher, she decided to join
it. From her national school, there were five women who joined, including
Plaintiff Kang Yong-jyu and Plaintiff Chong Su-ryon.
Oka called her to come to an inn during April of 1944. There were
many women between fourteen and twenty years old. After staying at the
inn for a night, she was taken to Shimonoseki by ship and from there to the
Tokyo Numazu Factory by train.
ii) Plaintiff Kang Yong-jyu was born on December 12, 1930 and
entered the national school in Pusan. When she was thirteen and in the
sixth year at the school, she and her classmate, Plaintiff Chong Su-ryon,
were told by her teacher, Saito Shizue, "Everyone will go there. If you go,
you should go ahead. Then you can make more money and study more"
and "The pay will be good and you can live in a nice dormitory." Both of
" They took a round-about way to get there in order to avoid possible submarine attacks. Since they
had to be on the ship for such a long time, they suffered from seasickness.
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them trusted Saito Shizue, so without knowing the details, they consented to
join the female Teishintai labor force. Then, just like Plaintiff Lee Yong-
son, they were taken to the Tokyo Numazu Factory.
iii) They lived in a dormitory located on the premises of the factory.
At the dormitory, a group of twelve women lived together in an eleven
square-meter room. They had to obtain permits to go out. They woke up at
five in the morning and after breakfast, they cleaned up their room and went
to the factory.
iv) Their main staple was yam or rice with yam. The amount was so
small that they were always hungry.
v) According to their testimonies, they started to work from six or
seven o'clock in the morning to six or seven o'clock in the evening. They
had to work twelve hours a day. According to their claim, despite some
ambiguities, their factory produced linen threads for airplane wings and
their work was to spin the wheel and to separate the coil of thread from the
wheel. They were always hungry and were kept standing during the twelve-
hour shift. Their lives were hard.
vi) Later, as the war situation grew worse, the Tokyo Numazu Factory
became subject to air raids and on July 17, 1945, the factory and
dormitories were destroyed. The tremendous sound of the bomb explosion
was so frightening, they evacuated into the rice paddy or behind rocks for
the entire night.
vii) After the Tokyo factory was destroyed, they went to the Fuji
Spinning Koyama factory in Koyama, Shunto-gun, Shizuoka Prefecture.
Soon after that, World War II ended and Korea was liberated. After that,
Plaintiff Lee Yong-son and Plaintiff Chong Su-ryon went back to Korea via
Nigata. Plaintiff Kang Yong-jyu was left behind, but went back to Pusan
via Shimonoseki with a Korean man whom she met on the way.
viii) The Plaintiffs have not received any money. Nor did they study
in Japan as promised.
c. Plaintiff Yang Kum-dok
i) Plaintiff Yang Kum-dok was born in the city near Kwangju on
November 30, 1929.12 In May of 1943, during her sixth-year at the national
school, two military policemen and School Principal Masaki came to her
" The year of her birth is officially recorded as 1931.
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class and said, "An intelligent, healthy girl like you can make a lot of
money and attend an all-girls school if she goes to Japan to work. When
you come back you can buy a house. Those who want to go, raise your
hand." All of her classmates raised their hands. Nine of them were chosen
to go, including herself. School Principal Masaki told them, "Those of you
who want to go must get the stamp (signature) from your father." Her
teacher Masumoto also told her, "You have to tell your parents where you
are going and what you will be doing." When she went home, she told her
parents. However, her parents were opposed to it, so she took her family
stamp and brought it to Masumoto. Her father later scolded her for taking
the stamp without permission, but she was still happy with the prospect that
she could go to school.
ii) On the day of departure, led by Korean teachers and military
police, she and twenty-three women took the train. She was among the
youngest in the group. They got off the train at Yeosu and were greeted by
a marching band. There were about 140 women, between the ages of
thirteen and seventeen, from such places as Kwangju and Mogpo. Military
policemen then led them to a ship which took them to Shimonoseki. From
Shimonoseki, they went by train to Nagoya.
iii) At the dormitory in the Mitsubishi Dotoku Factory, they were
greeted by Dormitory Director Yamazoe Sanpei, a dormitory mother of
about fifty years of age and a male office worker of about twenty-five years
of age. Seven or eight women from the same region were assigned to each
room. The rooms were approximately five square meters. Older members
slept on the sleeping mats, while younger members slept on the floor.
In military style, they were divided into squads, regiments, and units.
Every morning a Japanese leader came from the factory and made them line
up in a quarter column. They marched to the factory as they sang "the song
of the female Teishintai labor force" and other military songs. They came
back from the factory in the same fashion. One day, as they were coming
back from the factory, some young Japanese national school students yelled
at them, "Stupid Koreans" and "Korean bums." She ran to them and hit
them out of anger. Afterwards, the director severely scolded her.
They had two days off per month. However, they were not allowed to
go out. They usually spent their free time doing laundry.
iv) For breakfast, they had rice with wheat and two salty plums; for
lunch, rice and some pickles; and for dinner, rice and one meager dish. The
members were always hungry. One day, out of extreme hunger, she went to
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the canteen and ate some pickles. They were so salty that she had to drink a
lot of water. Because she drank too much, she suffered from diarrhea. On
another occasion, she found some discarded food in the trash. When she
tried to eat it, a Japanese female student stepped on her feet hard and called
her "Korean Bum."
v) At the factory, they worked on Army reconnaissance airplanes.
She learned how to use a scraping tool on various parts. Her job was to
wash the parts with alcohol. Later she was transferred to another job,
painting the propellers. She had to hold a large, heavy spraying machine
while standing. It was extremely hard work. They woke up at six and
worked from 8:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. (in winter, from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.).
They had to wear a bandana on which the word "Kamikaze" was written.
vi) The To-Nankai Earthquake hit the factory on December 7, 1944.
Since she did not know what an earthquake was, she thought it was an air
raid. While looking for some protective headgear, the roof and walls
collapsed and she was buried alive by lathes. A machine hit her shoulder
hard and the back of her leg was injured. Even now, she feels pain in the
shoulder and still has a very large scar on her leg. After that, the factory
was subject to air raids every night and she often had to run to the shelter.
One time, a bomb was dropped about 100 meters away from the dormitory.
Fortunately, the dormitory was not destroyed by fire.
vii) After that, the workers at the Mitsubishi Dotoku Factory
evacuated to different places. She evacuated to the Daimon factory in
Toyama. She performed the same kind of job there. Then, the end of
World War II and the subsequent liberation came. The leader took them to
Shimonoseki by train, and from there, they went back to Pusan. From
Pusan, she took the train and arrived at her hometown on October 22, 1945.
viii) Like the other Plaintiffs, she did not receive any money. Nor did
she go to any school in Japan. Furthermore, her service to the female
Teishintai labor force became an obstacle for marriage. At that time, it was
normal for a woman to marry at the age of eighteen. She had some
arrangements for marriage, but when her prospective bridegrooms
discovered that she was in the female Teishintai labor force, they all
declined the arrangements. Consequently, she hid the fact that she was a
member of the female Teishintai labor force and got married when she was
twenty-one years old.
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III. LEGAL ISSUES
A. The Fundamental Issues
1) Although the Plaintiffs' testimonies, set forth [in the pleadings] are
not particularly clear and it is difficult to ascertain their main ideas, the
court finds the testimony to include the following fundamental legal issues:
a) Does the Japanese Constitution admit the illegal nature of the
invasive war conducted by Imperial Japan and of its ensuing colonization,
and does that admission present a constitutional duty to officially apologize
and provide individual compensation to the victims? 3
b) Is it possible that such a duty does not arise out of the present
Japanese Constitution, but instead, arises out of the Meiji Constitution in
effect at the time of the invasive war and colonization? Specifically, could
Article 27 of the Meiji Constitution apply to the present compensation
demand?' 4
c) Does the Japanese Constitution require that the Government of
Japan officially apologize and compensate the victims of Japanese
aggression due to the government's failure to pass a law requiring such an
apology and compensation, rather than because of the actual invasion that
took place before the current Japanese Constitution was enacted?
5
d) Is it possible that compensation due to breach of contract is
available to the Teishintai Plaintiffs? 6
These are the main issues facing the Court in this case.
2) Next, the court will consider the Plaintiffs' testimonies for each of
the issues presented above. [The claim] concerning former Minister of
Justice Nagano's comment is considered part of an ordinary reparation
demand against the state; however, the section about high-ranking
government officials' comments and the section about the questions and
responses in the Diet are more closely related to the "duty of the moral
state" argument and, therefore, can be interpreted as part of issues 1)a) and
c) above.
'3 This issue arises from the demand based on the "duty of the moral state" argument.
This issue arises from the demand based on Article 27 of the Meiji Constitution.
" This issue arises from the demand based on the "failure to legislate a necessary law" argument.
'6 This issue arises from the demand based on unpaid labor, a violation of the Teishintai labor
contract.
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B. Demand for an Official Apology and Demands for Compensation
Based upon the "Duty of a Moral State"
1) In the period of the Japanese occupation of Korea, between 1937
and 1945, the "Comfort Women" Plaintiffs were forcefully taken to the
comfort stations in Taiwan and Shanghai and forced to have sexual
intercourse with a number of soldiers. In the same period, the Teishintai
Plaintiffs were taken to war-related factories such as the Fujikoshi Toyama
Factory, and were subjected to long hard labor in the female Teishintai labor
force. They suffered from physical and psychological damage. The Cairo
Declaration of 1943, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, and the Preamble
and Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution together impose the "duty of a
moral state" on the Japanese government to apologize and compensate the
victims of Japan's invasion and colonial rule. Furthermore, indirectly
applying Article 1, Section 1 and Article 4 of the State Liability Act and
Article 723 of the Civil Law Act, the Plaintiffs have the right to request an
official apology and compensation.
2) The Court will now analyze Plaintiffs' "duty of the moral state"
argument.
a) The following are the main points of the Plaintiffs' argument.
i) The Potsdam Declaration signed by Imperial Japan states, "the
Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.
Freedom of speech, religion, and thought, as well as respect for fundamental
human rights shall be established." The Potsdam Declaration further
required that "the Government of Japan shall follow the will of the people,
be peace-loving and responsible."
This declaration made the Meiji Constitution, which was based upon
the authority of the Emperor, unjustifiable, and made the enactment of a
new constitution based on the authority of the people inevitable. The
Potsdam Declaration is the basis for the Japanese Constitution. The Cairo
Declaration, which is referenced in the Potsdam Declaration, is also a basis
for the Japanese Constitution. The Cairo Declaration denounces the
colonial policies that the Japanese government had pursued since the Meiji
Restoration and demands the restoration of areas damaged by Japanese
invasion. Thus, these two declarations regard Japan's expansion of territory
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and colonial rule as invasive acts. The Japanese Constitution, based upon
these declarations, requires the same understanding.
ii) Thus, the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution, "[The Japanese
people] resolve that never again shall the horrors of war occur through the
actions of its government," should not be interpreted simply as denial of
war based on humanism, but as a sign of remorse for the invasive war and
colonial rule of Japan's past. Furthermore, the Japanese Constitution states,
"we the Japanese people, desire peace for all time" and also includes the
"renunciation of war," Article 9. Moreover, the Japanese Constitution, as in
its Preamble, not only renounces war, but confirms the right to live in peace
as the right of all people and regards the active effort to eliminate violence
and war as the duty of the Japanese people.
iii) Imperial Japan deprived the Asian people of the right to live in
peace by its invasive war and colonization. The victims still suffer from
this damage.
The Japanese Constitution, which guarantees all people the right to
live in peace, obligates the Defendant to issue an apology and provide
compensation for the damage caused by Imperial Japan. In other words,
Japan has the "duty of the moral state," mentioned in the Preamble and
Article 9 of its Constitution, to issue an official apology and pay
compensation to its victims.
The Preamble of the Japanese Constitution states that the "duty of the
moral state" has the utmost priority and must be accomplished by all means
to preserve the "national honor" of Japan. The Diet must establish a law to
officially apologize and compensate the victims of its aggression, and
specify to whom it applies and how this should be accomplished. However,
because the Diet has failed to pass such a law, the judiciary, which is also
bound by the "duty of the moral state," should determine how and to whom
the government should express its apology and provide compensation
through the analogous application of appropriate laws. Thus, the issue is
the damage caused by the illegal activities of public servants during colonial
rule. The judiciary can and should apply the State Indemnification Act to
this case.
iv) It is true that the aforementioned acts were committed by Japan
prior to the enactment of the Japanese Constitution and the State
Indemnification Act, but the "duty of the moral state" cannot be affected by
the statute of limitations. This is because the "duty of the moral state" is
Japan's present legal obligation. Since the Plaintiffs are not simply
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accusing the Defendant of past illegal activities, the retroactivity of the State
Indemnification Act is not a problem.
The court has understood the Plaintiffs' argument to be the above.
b) The court finds the following problems with the Plaintiffs'
argument:
i) It is widely understood that when Imperial Japan accepted the
Potsdam Declaration, the Emperor-centered foundation of the Meiji
Constitution could not continue. It therefore became necessary, in terms of
legal justification and legal values, to introduce a constitutional system
based on the rights of the people. Moreover, the Potsdam Declaration itself,
as the Plaintiffs point out, as well as the public proclamation of the Allies
on August 11, 1945, made the necessity of a new constitution clear. The
Potsdam Declaration was appropriate given the world political situation at
the time, because it limited the military power of Imperial Japan and
ordered the military occupation and reformation of Japan. In these ways,
the court recognizes that the Potsdam Declaration was the basis of the
Japanese Constitution.
However, it is difficult to consider the Cairo Declaration in the same
way as the Potsdam Declaration. The Cairo Declaration was signed by
three of the major Allied nations that were fighting with Imperial Japan,
England, China, and the United States. The Potsdam Declaration refers to
the Cairo Declaration to support the fundamental policies of China,
England, and the United States concerning the Japanese-occupied
territories, for example, a demand that Japan return Manchuria and Taiwan
to China and give Korea its independence. The Cairo Declaration has no
relevance to the Japanese Constitution. It is difficult to interpret the Cairo
Declaration as a document that asserts the illegal nature of Imperial Japan's
invasive war and colonial rule since the Meiji era and demands amends for
the damage that it caused.
Furthermore, the Cairo Declaration was signed by the three Allied
Nations against their enemy, Imperial Japan, and states, "The Three Great
Allies express their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal
enemy by sea, land, and air. The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to
restrain and punish the aggression of Japan." This declaration is highly
political and was written from a strategic perspective. Hence, it is
inappropriate to give this declaration the power of law. For example, if
Imperial Japan had won the war, the spoils of Imperial Japan would have
had the support of law. Historically the Cairo Declaration provided the
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basis for the Potsdam Declaration, but it is difficult to regard the Cairo
Declaration as providing the same basis for the Japanese Constitution as the
Potsdam Declaration.
The basis for the Japanese Constitution is limited to sections in the
Potsdam Declaration that encourage Japan to carry out reforms, such as
"[t]he Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people;"
"freedom of speech, religion, and thought, as well as respect for
fundamental human rights shall be established;" and "the Japanese
government shall follow the will of the people and be peace-loving and
responsible." It is difficult to interpret the Potsdam Declaration as a
statement that orders Japan to express an official apology and pay
compensation to the victims of Imperial Japan's war and colonial rule.
ii) The argument based on the "right to live in peace" is problematic
as well. The Plaintiffs' assertion regarding the "right to live in peace" is
inconsistent. The Japanese Constitution defined "the right to live in peace"
for the first time, but the invasive war took place before the enactment of
the Japanese Constitution. Hence, it is illogical to apply "the right to live in
peace" to an incident which took place prior to its enactment. In accordance
with the Preamble of the Constitution, plaintiffs must confirm that "the right
to live in peace" existed at the time Imperial Japan was conducting the
invasive war. Yet, this seems to be impossible. Moreover, if the
confirmation of "the right to live in peace" is such that the Japanese
government has the duty to apologize and compensate the victims of
Imperial Japan's invasion and colonial rule, then the relation between "the
right to live in peace" and the "duty of the moral state" becomes ambiguous.
Furthermore, the rights as prescribed by "the right to live in peace"
are problematic. The Preamble of the Japanese Constitution declares that
one of the motivations for enacting the new constitution was to establish
pacifism. The Preamble itself is the basis for the ideal of pacifism, as well
as for Japan's position in the international community. To realize "the right
to live in peace, free from fear and want," international cooperation is
necessary to keep order. If Japan "desire[s] to occupy an honored place in
an international society," it must make an effort to contribute to the
international peace within the limit of Article 9. There are a number of
ways to make such contributions depending on the international
circumstances. In other words, "the peace," as defined in "the right to live
in peace," is fundamentally an ideal or a goal, and "the right to live in
JANUARY 1999
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
peace" is something for which the Diet or the cabinet strives, as an
institution that was elected by the people in accordance with the governing
principles of the Constitution. It does so through the implementation of its
policies, while paying tribute to the Preamble and Article 9 of the
Constitution. In sum, "the right to live in peace" is an abstract legal theory
at this point in history and does not serve as the basis for rights in a court of
law.
Perhaps each Japanese citizen should sincerely accept personal
responsibility as an aggressor, feel remorse for the fact that Imperial Japan
inflicted immeasurable suffering upon the people of Asia through its
invasive war and colonization, and owes them an apology. However, the
Preamble and Article 9 of the Constitution do not provide the legal basis for
direct apology and compensation to the victims by the state.
iii) In addition, certain aspects of the "duty of the moral state"
argument are not easy to understand. According to the Plaintiffs' assertion,
the "duty of the moral state" requires an apology and compensation for the
victims of the invasive war in its concrete manifestation. On the one hand,
it requires the Diet to pass a law to express an apology and provide
compensation. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs directly demand the
judiciary to order the government to express an apology and provide
compensation, because the government has failed to do these things. If the
"duty of the moral state" creates a legislative duty, the Diet's failure to pass
such a law is a violation of this duty and, consequently, the request for
apology and compensation should be limited to this violation alone.
However, the Plaintiffs seem to demand that the judiciary remedy the
damage, which should have been remedied through legislation. In this
understanding, the "duty of the moral state" implies a judicial solution that
replaces the legislation, the Plaintiffs' right to make requests against the
Defendant. This remedy is outside of the statute of limitations and requires
existing law as its premise. The argument for indirect application of the
State Liability Act derives from this understanding. However appropriate
this solution is, this sort of understanding completely violates the separation
of powers as described in the Constitution and the general understanding of
the power of the judiciary. Hence, the Plaintiffs' "duty of the moral state"
argument is baseless and beyond the power of this court.
This court offers an additional comment. The Plaintiffs asserted that
the "duty of the moral state" was a legal duty, not a moral duty, and that if
"the moral state" is the government that carries out its moral duty, then the
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moral duty of the state becomes the legal duty, by the assertion that the state
has the same legal duty. This is a contradiction and its logic is that of mere
words. In fact, the content of the "duty of the moral state" is extremely
diverse.' This diversity, however, derives from the ambiguity between the
moral duty and the legal duty in the Plaintiffs' argument. Therefore, as a
theory of legal interpretation, the Plaintiffs should examine the legal duty of
the Japanese Constitution itself, instead of concerning themselves with
proving the content of the "duty of the moral state." For these reasons, the
Plaintiffs' "duty of the moral state" argument has major flaws and is not a
mature argument. Hence, the court does not accept this argument.
c) In order to examine the attitude of the Japanese Constitution
toward Imperial Japan's war and its colonial rule, the court must rely on the
Preamble of the Constitution, as no other parts of the main text refer to this
issue. The following three sections illustrate this point: Section 1, "[the
Japanese people] resolved that never again shall we be visited with the
horrors of war;" Section 2, "the right to live in peace;" and Section 3, "no
nation is responsible to itself alone." In Section 1, "Never shall we be
visited with the horrors of war," is not just for the Japanese people but for
all peoples. In Section 2, "the right to live in peace," is the right given to all
peoples. Section 3 must be read in light of the Potsdam Declaration's ban
on militarism, and its regulations for the removal from office and the
punishment of war criminals, as a rejection of Imperial Japan's policy of
"Devotion to your own country, disregard for other countries." Section 3
thus was a response to the wrongs Japan committed during the war.
This reflection is clearly explained on page fifty-five of "Chukai
Nihonkoku-Kenpo" (Ho-gaku Kyoukai) [Collected Comments on the
Japanese Constitution Vol. 1], and was quite obvious to the generation of
legal scholars who witnessed the transition from the Meiji Constitution to
the present Japanese Constitution. There is no doubt that the Japanese
Constitution was written with remorse for Imperial Japan's war and colonial
rule, and aimed to bring reforms. However, this remorse does not mean that
the Constitution orders a direct apology and compensation to the victims of
the militarism, nor does it create a duty to legislate restitution.
First, there is a question whether the Preamble of the Japanese
Constitution can be used in court proceedings. The "right to live in peace"
is simply an abstract concept. It does not have the legal power to force the
" As [the pleadings show] this diversity includes the duty to legislate a necessary law and the duty
to investigate.
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Japanese government to apologize and compensate acts not even written in
the Constitution. Nor does it have the power to punish the government if it
fails to carry out these acts.
Second, the Preamble of the Constitution is written in accordance
with international cooperation for peace and with mutual respect for the
sovereignty of nations. At the time the Japanese Constitution was written,
reparation issues were normally resolved through international treaties, such
as a peace treaty. Because the Constitution must be interpreted from this
perspective, the victims of militarism should be compensated through
international treaties. It is difficult to recognize that the Japanese
government has the legislative duty to apologize and compensate, other than
through international treaties.
The Japanese Constitution does not provide any ground for the legal
duty to express an apology and pay compensation to individual victims of
militarism.
d) Given the failure of this argument, the Plaintiffs' request for
apology and compensation based on "the duty of the moral state" does not
have any legal ground.
In relation to other arguments, the "Comfort Woman" system violated
the dignity of individuals, as defined in the Japanese Constitution. However
dehumanizing it was, it took place prior to the enactment of the Japanese
Constitution, and it is illogical to assert that the Japanese Constitution
applies to it even without special means. The court should examine the
damage inflicted upon the victims after the enactment of the Constitution.
C. Compensation Based on Article 27 of the Meiji Constitution
1) The Plaintiffs assert that due to Imperial Japan's national policies
for war and colonial rule, they were forced to serve as "Comfort Women" or
members of the female Teishintai labor force through deception and flattery.
As a result, their personal rights and/or property rights have been violated
through physical and psychological damage, unpaid labor, and separation
from their families. In other words, the policies of Imperial Japan sacrificed
their rights for the "public benefit" and this sacrifice was a major violation
of the Plaintiffs' personal and property rights to such an extent that the
notion of these rights themselves were called into question. Hence, the
Plaintiffs suffered "special damage."
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Since these incidents occurred under the Meiji Constitution, the
Plaintiffs have the right to appeal for compensation based on Article 27 of
the Meiji Constitution.
2) However, it is unclear whether the Meiji Constitution is applicable
now, since it was abolished when the Japanese Constitution was enacted,
and the new constitution does not contain any article to carry over the effect
of the previous constitution.
One possibility is for the court to take the stance that the Meiji
Constitution is effective as long as it does not violate the present
constitution. 8 However, Article 24, Clause 1 of the Meiji Constitution
states that Japanese nationals do not experience the violation of property
rights, and Clause 2 states that the law will determine the measures for the
sacrificial act done for the public good. Property rights are limited in view
of the public good. The compensation right for lost property is given only if
there was a special written measure. The precedents under the Meiji
Constitution follow this interpretation. Therefore, it is clear that the
compensation right for the lost property under the Meiji Constitution must
accompany a written measure.
The Plaintiffs argue that the Meiji Constitution should be interpreted
from the present point of view and applied to this case. The Plaintiffs'
argument is actually for the retroactivity of the Japanese Constitution. This
argument is unsustainable. Therefore, given that the Plaintiffs'
interpretation of the compensation law fails, the claim for a right of
compensation that derives from Article 27 of the Meiji Constitution cannot
succeed.
3) It is not necessary to consider other points in the argument. There
is no basis for the Plaintiffs' demand for compensation based on Article 27
of the Meiji Constitution.
D. Compensation for Failure to Legislate a Necessary Law
1) The Plaintiffs argue that considering the Preamble, Article 9,
Article 14, Article 17, Article 29 Clauses 1 and 3, Article 40, and Article 98
Clause 2 of the Japanese Constitution, it is obvious that Defendant Diet
members have the duty to enact a law providing reparation or compensation
to the victims of Imperial Japan's invasive war and colonial rule.
"8 The court is fully aware that even if it is possible for the regular laws to continue to be effective, it
is impossible for the Meiji Constitution itself to continue to be effective under the present constitution.
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Defendants have not done so in the more than fifty years since the end of
World War II and the Sino-Japanese War, and there has been more than
enough time to enact it. Out of this failure, a certain wrongdoing has been
committed. The Plaintiffs continue to argue that they have a provisional
right to claim an apology and compensation based on Article 1 Section 1
and Article 4 of the State Liability Act and Article 723 of the Civil Law Act.
2) As for the compensation demand based on the failure to legislate a
necessary law, there is precedent in the Supreme Court Judgment, dated
November 21, 1985, to which both the Plaintiff and the Defendant referred.
This judgment determines the framework of this court's interpretation.
a) Therefore, the judgment is:
The State Liability Act Article 1, Section 1, states that when public
servants violate their professional legal duties, which are for the benefit of
individuals, and inflict damage on such individuals, the nation of Japan or
other public institutions will provide compensation. This leads to the
question, whether the Diet members' legislative activities (including the
failure to legislate a necessary law) are subject to the violation of the
professional legal duties. It should be separated from the issues of whether
it is constitutional to legislate bad laws and whether it is constitutional not
to legislate good laws. In this light, the following issue must be examined:
what kind of duty does each Diet member have in relation with individuals?
Under the system of representative democracy as guaranteed in the
Constitution, the legislative activities of the Diet should reflect diverse
opinions and values in a fair manner, adjust them through free debates
among the Diet members, and finally converge them into the unified will of
the nation of Japan. Each Diet member has a duty to consider diverse
opinions, reflect them in legislative activities, and care for the well-being of
the people. In order to guarantee effective legislative activities, the actual
activities in the Diet should rest on each Diet member's political judgment
and their results should be judged by the people through election. Each Diet
member has the same duty under the Japanese Constitution. The
Constitution serves as the law of the laws, but the interpretation of the
Constitution varies among the Japanese people. Article 51 of the Japanese
Constitution protects the Diet members from being held legally liable for
speeches and votes cast in the Diet. This is due to the expectation that if
they are only politically liable, the Diet members as representatives of the
people will be able to serve the country better, and that the Diet members
are politically responsible for their own acts.
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The legislative activities of Diet members are fundamentally political,
and therefore do not fit well within the normal rule of law. According to the
Supreme Court judgment noted above, the Diet members' failure to legislate
certain laws can be illegal. In conclusion, the Supreme Court stated,
"Concerning the passage of legislation, the Diet members are held
politically liable in their relations with the people, but are not held legally
liable in their relations with individuals. In accordance with the application
of Article 1, Section 1, of the State Liability Act, except when Diet
members directly and clearly violate the Constitution, their legislative
activities cannot be judged to be illegal." This was the holding of the
judgment.
Inferring from the Japanese Constitution, when and what kind of law
the Diet passes depends solely on the Diet itself, and its decisions are
affected by the political situation of the time. Thus, this court follows the
opinion of Supreme Court judgment.
b) However, this court has a different opinion on the issue of
"exceptions." In considering "the failure to legislate a necessary law," if
the "failure" infringes upon the basic human rights, which constitute the
fundamental principle of the Japanese Constitution, the "exception" applies,
and the "failure" is a violation of the State Liability Act.
The Supreme Court concludes that the Diet members do 'not have
legal liability with regard to the rights of certain Japanese. For a
representative democracy to function in an effective and appropriate
manner, it is desirable that the actual legislative activities rely on the
political decisions of the Diet members, and the decisions are judged by the
free debate among the people and by elections. In other words, it considers
that the legislative activities of the Diet members are fundamentally
political and; due to their nature, should be free from legal constraints. 9
However, the Japanese Constitution reflects the fact that a
representative democracy under its founding principle alone failed to
function effectively and brought the violence of the majority against
minorities. The Japanese Constitution is founded on a principal of basic
human rights. It is this fundamental principle which ensures that
representative democracy functions. Representative democracy was chosen
as a political system specifically to guarantee basic human rights.
" In the explanation of the Supreme Court judgment, "[i]nterpretation of the Constitution" is not
clear and "the privilege not to be held accountable" is meaningless, since the Japanese legal system
distinguishes "accountability" from "illegality."
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In order to ensure the function of the representative democracy, the
judiciary has the right to examine the laws. Hence, when the basic rights of
the individual are infringed, the Diet members have the constitutional duty
to amend the wrong, and the court has the constitutional right and duty to
stop such infringement. This duty is not affected by whether such
infringement was brought forth by the existing law or by the failure to
legislate a necessary law. However, the scope and exercise of rights differ
between the legislature and the judiciary because there are different
functions and abilities between the two, shown by the distinct functions of
the Diet and the Courts.
Moreover, the judiciary maintains the right of judicial review of laws
as a basic Constitutional principle. However, the right of judicial review is
normally exercised when a law damages an individual, rather than for
failure to legislate a necessary law to amend human rights violations. It is
more difficult for the court to implement an amendment for the failure to
legislate a necessary law. To denounce an existing law, the court only has
to prevent enforcement. Because of the many difficulties in accepting a suit
to prove the unconstitutionality of a failure to legislate and grant relief, the
only solution that the court can usually offer is to recognize liability under
the State Liability Act. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court be
given more leeway to recognize the illegality of the failure to legislate a
necessary law.
As shown above, compensation by the state based on the failure to
legislate a necessary law relies heavily on the partition of the roles between
the Diet and the court in the Constitution, and on the unique right and duty
of the court, namely to guarantee constitutional rights. This issue also arises
in areas where legislators do not have any power. This failure is illegal in
view of the State Liability Act. "The law (or the failure to legislate the law)
is a direct and clear violation of the Constitution and the Diet intentionally
legislates (or does not legislate) the law." It is also illegal when the Diet
members understand the necessity of the law to protect human rights and
are able to legislate, but have not done so for a reasonable period of time.
In other words, when the legislative responsibility is clear and enough time
is given to the Diet but the Diet has failed to pass the law, the court should
accept the compensation responsibility of the state.
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3. Conclusions in Light of the Above Analysis
a. Conclusions regarding the "Comfort Women"
i) The facts make it clear that the Plaintiffs became "Comfort
Women" through the deception of the probable comfort station owners,
were confined and forced to have sex with the Imperial Japanese soldiers,
and that even after the war, they physically suffered a great deal. In
addition, they suffered much due to shame.
It is also clear that the "Comfort Women" system was a manifestation
of sexism and racism of the time which severely violated the dignity of
women and profoundly damaged racial pride, and that it is not the past
issue, but rather the ongoing human rights issue that should be resolved
now.
For example, evidence [in the Pleadings] includes the following
document.
CHAPTER 9 RULES CONCERNING THE USE OF THE COMFORT
STATION
March, 13t
' year of Showa, the interior regulation for the stationed military force,
Dokuritsu-Kojo 2 "d Cannon Battalion.
SERVICE FEE
(One person cannot use the service for more than an hour at a time.)
Chinese I yen 00 sen
Korean 1 yen 50 sen
Japanese 2 yen 00 sen
DO NOT CONSUME ALCOHOL IN THE COMFORT STATION.
CONSIDER THAT ALL THE WOMEN ARE VENEREAL DISEASE CARRIERS AND
PROTECT YOURSELF FROM SUCH DISEASES.
THE "COMFORT WOMEN" CANNOT SERVE ALCOHOL, TEA OR FOOD.
THE "COMFORT WOMEN" CANNOT GO OUTSIDE OTHER THAN CERTAIN
DESIGNATED PLACES.
This is the guideline for the use of the comfort station. It determines
the service fee and the duration of the service. There is no interaction other
than sex. The soldiers came purely for sex. The "Comfort Women" are
simply a necessity for the comfort station. This institution was designed
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just for sex and the release of sexual desire. Given the purpose and day-to-
day reality of the comfort station as described above, the "Comfort Women"
were sex slaves. In addition, there was a strong racial bias. The court
surmises that the race-based difference in service fees resulted not only out
of supply-and-demand, but out of the fundamental racism that underlies the
"Comfort Women" system.
ii) Concerning human rights, Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution
states, "All the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not
interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation
and in other governmental affairs." In this Article, the Constitution regards
the respect for individuality and the dignity of individuals as its
fundamental principles. Given the clarity of the case, as mentioned, there
should be no further analysis on the fact that the "Comfort Woman" system
has severely violated the dignity of women and profoundly damaged racial
pride.
As mentioned in the analysis of the "duty of the moral state"
argument, the "Comfort Woman" system and the fact that the "Comfort
Women" Plaintiffs were forced to become "Comfort Women" occurred
prior to the enactment of the Japanese Constitution. Therefore, no matter
how serious the human rights violations were, it is wrong to consider that
the Japanese Constitution has the power to force the government to provide
compensation, or endows the court with the right to come up with
restoration measures in place of the compensation.
iii) However, given the severity of the human rights violation in the
"Comfort Woman" issue, as well as the damages which linger to this day,
the following analysis is possible.
The "Comfort Woman" phenomenon could have been a violation of
the International Treaty Concerning the Slave Trade of Women and
Children (1921) or the International Labor Treaty (1930). Furthermore,
considering the fact that women were deceived and coerced into sex slavery
by the military, their servitude was extremely inhuman and horrifying even
for the conditions of the time. This should not have happened in Imperial
Japan, the nation that boasted it was so civilized. Despite all this, not only
the Imperial Japanese forces, but also the Imperial Government were
responsible. As a result, the "Comfort Women's" human rights were
seriously infringed, their lives were altered, and, due to the cultural stigma
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in their countries, the "Comfort Women" have suffered great shame ever
since.
Legal tradition and the fundamental interpretive principles of the law
and justice dictate that the court should impose a duty on legislators to
provide the victims for the prior violation of their legal rights. In this
application, whenever the Plaintiffs' legal rights are seriously violated, even
if the acts were committed prior to the enactment of the Japanese
Constitution by the Imperial Japanese Government itself, Defendant
Japan-having the fundamental identity as Imperial Japan-has the duty to
provide certain measures to prevent the victims from further damage.
Moreover, it has the duty to provide further measures to ensure this
protection.
Because the Japanese Constitution acknowledges the dignity of
individuals and respect for individuality as one of its fundamental
principles, and because the Constitution was in part enacted in remorse for
the terrible deeds committed by the Imperial Government, Defendant Japan
has a very serious duty to provide restitution. Hence, since Japan has
known the facts surrounding the plight of the "Comfort Women" for some
time, by refusing to provide restitution, it compounded the Plaintiffs'
suffering. In other words, the failure to legislate the necessary law caused
another violation of the humanity of the "Comfort Women."
By May or June 1990, the "Comfort Woman" issue was known
internationally and was beginning to be discussed in the Diet. Given the
failure to provide restitution measures for many years, the advanced ages of
the former "Comfort Women," the comment by the chief of the
Employment Security Bureau at the Ministry of Labor [noted in the
pleadings], and the promotion of historical research that proved that the
people in the 1930s and 1940s realized the necessity of stopping
discrimination against women and the necessity of sexual freedom, the
unconstitutionality and illegality of the "Comfort Women" became clear.
iv) According to [the Pleadings], the Foreign Affairs Section under
the Cabinet Secretariat issued a report entitled, "On the issue of the
'Comfort Women"' on August 4, 1993. The cabinet secretariat of the time,
Kono Yohei, remarked:
The Recreation and "Comfort Women" Department was
established due to the request by the military and the military
was directly involved in the establishment and maintenance of
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the comfort houses, as well as the transportation of the
"Comfort Women." As for assembling the "Comfort Women,"
the private agents who were requested by the military, carried
out this task through deceit and coercion. As a result, many
women became sexual slaves. Moreover, in some cases, the
military police assisted these private agents. The lives of the
"Comfort Women" were truly horrible.
As for the origin of the "Comfort Women," except for Japan,
most came from the Korean Peninsula, which was under
Japanese occupation at that time.
No matter how I look at it, this conduct on the part of the
Imperial State was about the severe violation of women's
dignity and was carried out with the involvement of the
military. The Japanese govemment hereby apologizes and
shows its remorse to those who were subjected to such great
suffering as a result, and are still suffering from the mental, as
well as physical, scars. And I think that with the help of
scholars, we should seriously consider how the Japanese
government can express its apology.
In conclusion, the Cabinet Secretariat stated that: the "Comfort
Women" issue was a severe human rights violation, namely discrimination
against women and multiple races; that "The Japanese government should
apologize;" and "With the help of scholars we should seriously consider
how the Japanese government can express its apology." When this
statement was issued, Germany, the United States and Canada had already
passed laws to apologize and compensate the foreign victims whose rights
were violated by those States. °
• Given these facts and the notion that the "Comfort Women" system
stands side by side with the Nazi war crimes in its scope of human rights
violations, the failure to legislate an official apology and compensation
further violates the human rights of the victims. Soon after the Cabinet
Secretariat's comment on August 4, 1993, enactment of such a law became
the constitutional duty of the government. By the end of August, 1996,
20 [The pleadings show] both parties are in agreement on this fact.
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three years after the Secretariat's remark, there had been sufficient time to
pass legislation. At this point, the failure to enact the law became illegal
according to the State Liability Act.
Since Defendant Diet members could easily interpret the
aforementioned legislative duty as their legislative goal, they have clearly
committed negligence.
v) According to this analysis, in accordance with Article 1, Section 1
of the State Liability Act, the court recognizes the Plaintiffs' claim that they
have the right to demand compensation and, with the prospect that the
Plaintiffs' violated rights will be restored by a proper legislation in the near
future, the amount of money paid to the "Comfort Women" Plaintiffs
should be 300 thousand yen.
Furthermore, as for the "Comfort Women" Plaintiffs' request for an
official apology, in accordance with its own ability, the Diet should decide
how it is going to be issued. It is unclear whether the court has jurisdiction
over this issue. Given this understanding, the court does not recognize the
necessity for the official apology at this point in time.
b. Conclusions Regarding the Female Teishintai Labor Force:
i) The members of the female Teishintai labor force were deceived
that they would be able to earn a lot of money, go to school and learn floral
arrangement, stitch work, and the use of a sewing machine. When they
were young, they were taken to war-related factories as unskilled workers.
As mentioned, under severe working conditions, they had to go through
much hardship. Furthermore, because of the racial discrimination that still
exists in Japanese society, it is easy to surmise that their hardship was worse
than that of the Japanese students who were mobilized by the Imperial
Japan.2'
ii) Although there is some association, the damage that the Teishintai
Plaintiffs suffered is different in quality and scope from that of the
"Comfort Women" Plaintiffs. The court can infer this fact [from the
21 However, concerning the fact that their teachers induced them to work for the female Teishintai
labor force, whether the teachers intentionally deceived them remains an unanswered question. According
to Witness Sugiyama Tomi, it is recognized that at least Moriya, teacher of Plaintiff Park So-duk, was also
deceived by the advertisement film and encouraged her to join the labor force out of good will. At any
rate, the evidence was not sufficient to determine what sort of notification the Japanese colonial
government gave to each school and whether the teachers induced them in order to intentionally deceive
them.
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Pleadings], which state that in Korea, people tend to confuse the members
of the female Teishintai labor force with the "Comfort Women." People
often consider the Teishintai labor force members to be "Comfort Women"
because of the Chinese character of the word, Teishintai. The ex-members
of the Teishintai labor force refrained from revealing themselves out of fear
of such misunderstanding. Among the testimonies presented in this case,
the testimony of Plaintiff Yang Kum-dok shows this fact.22 The fact that the
Teishintai Plaintiffs sought to avoid association as "Comfort Women"
reaffirms for the Court the seriousness of the human rights violations
suffered by the "Comfort Women."
As mentioned above, the "Comfort Women" issue is inextricably
intertwined with the violation of dignity and human rights of women.
Discrimination and repression against the "Comfort Women" victims
should be opposed and eliminated in both Korean and Japanese society.
Therefore, this Court resolutely advocates the dignity and human rights of
women and acknowledges the absolute necessity for reparations for
"Comfort Women." While the issue of the female Teishintai labor force
should not be taken lightly, we must consider the wartime food shortage,
mobilization of all Japanese students, oppressive militarism, the war
situation, earthquakes, and the fact that the Japanese were the subjects of the
Emperor and consequently lacked individual rights at the time. Moreover,
considering how much damage all the people in war zones and colonies
suffered due to the war, as well as how much the aggressor Japanese people
themselves suffered, in spite of their young age, it is difficult to accept that
the "Teishintai" laborers' suffering stands out, and that the violation of their
basic human rights is ongoing and rises' to the level of Constitutional
concern.
Thus, we find that the damage that the Teishintai Plaintiffs suffered
was within the scope of settled war reparations or compensation. Thus, the
legislative as well as executive bodies are responsible for this issue and
there is no constitutional duty to legislate restitution.
iii) The Court will not address the remaining demands because they
lack legal basis.
4) The judgment states: the Defendant has the duty to provide 300
thousand yen to "Comfort Women" Plaintiffs based on the failure to enact a
22 This fact is contained in other Teishintai Plaintiffs' testimonies as well.
VOL. 8 No. I
"COMFORT WOMEN" CASE
necessary law, but does not have the same duty towards the Teishintai
Plaintiffs.
E. Claims for Violation of the Teishin Labor Contract
1) The Teishintai members entered into an irregular Teishin labor
contract with the Imperial Japanese Government. The contract states that
the members will follow the direction of Imperial Japan and in return the
Imperial Japanese Government will provide to the Plaintiffs education and
lessons in floral arrangement, stitch work, and the use of a sewing machine.
In addition, Imperial Japan will be responsible for the Plaintiffs' safety
while in transport to and from factories, or on return to Korea. Plaintiffs
insist that since the Japanese government failed to perform, they are entitled
to damages.
2) The court accepts as fact that the Plaintiffs were told by such
people as their teachers at the national school, "If you join the Teishintai
labor force, you will receive good wages the opportunity to study," and "If
you go to Japan, you can learn flower arranging and sewing." We further
accept that such statements lead them to join the labor force. However, the
"Ordinance of the Female Teishintai Labor Force" provided for
mobilization during times of emergency. This was why the Plaintiffs
obeyed it and why they were part of the mobilization process. The
connection between the Plaintiffs and the Imperial Government was
publicly known, for it was based on the mobilization ordinance and,
therefore, any claim based on private contract cannot have effect.
Given the time when the Teishintai ordinance was issued, the
evidence for this case does not clarify what kind of mobilization law was in
effect at that time, but Plaintiffs were most likely mobilized
administratively, and in great numbers. According to the evidence, the
process of mobilization by administrative recommendation was as follows:
First, the Director of Operation in a Japanese prefecture sends an entreaty
for obtaining laborers to the governor of the prefecture and the governor
approves it. Next, the Director submits the application to the colonial
government in Korea and, after accepting it, the colonial government
decides from which region such laborers will be recruited. Then the
regional labor office, county government or city government determines
who is going to be mobilized and assembles them into groups. Finally, the
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Director of the operation comes to Korea and transports the groups of
laborers to the site of the operation in Japan.
However, it is not clear what kind of ordinance the colonial
government issued, nor what authority the colonial government had. The
court surmises, that according to the aforementioned process, the colonial
government was responsible for assembling laborers and passing them on to
the director of the operation. Again, the court cannot accept the theory that
the Teishin contract was effective outside of this mobilization process.
3) Hence, the court does not judge the rest of the demand, since there
is no legal basis for the claim based on the Teishintai labor contract.
F. Claim for Governmental Tort Liability
1) Regarding comments of Government Officials and their Responses
at the Diet:
a) The Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Japanese Government had a
constitutional duty to accept legal responsibility for the illegal activities that
the Imperial Government committed. Practically, they had the duty to write
an appropriate compensation bill, pass it, and investigate the "Comfort
Woman" as a concrete manifestation of its "duty as a moral state;" however,
the Defendant refused its legal responsibility and denied its direct
involvement in the establishment and maintenance of the "Comfort
Woman" system and that government officials gave inappropriate
comments and responses at the Diet. These acts, the Plaintiffs insist, are
unconstitutional and illegal based on the "duty Japan has as a moral state."
b) However, the court has made clear this "duty of the moral state"
argument was insufficient and unacceptable and that the Japanese
Constitution does not imply a legislative duty where the government must
issue an apology and provide compensation to the victims of the war and
colonial rule. Hence, the Defendant does not have the duty to write the
aforementioned bill or to investigate the issue. The comments and
responses of the government officials that the Plaintiffs raise are not illegal.
c) Hence, the appeal has no legal basis and the court does not judge
the remaining arguments.
2) Regarding comments by former Minister of Justice Nagano:
a) Both parties agree that at the April 28, 1994 inauguration speech,
former Minister of Justice Nagao made the following comments. In
response to the question asked by a journalist from the Kyodo Tsushin, "As
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a veteran, what do you think about Japan's war responsibility including the
'Comfort Women'?," former Minister of Juqtice Nagano answered:
It was historically wrong for such a major country to impose its
own will on surrounding countries, in the middle of the
twentieth century. However, with differences in degree, the
system of 'Comfort Women' existed in the American and
British forces. It is cruel and unfair for the Japanese if we
determine that only the Japanese military did such things. The
"Comfort Women" were prostitutes of the day. We should not
look at it from the perspective of today. We cannot say that it
was discrimination against women or Koreans.
b) Plaintiffs appeal that this comment severely violated the Plaintiffs'
humanity and dignity and that compensation must be paid, based on Article
1, Section 1 of the State Liability Act.
Under civil law, dignity is not a pure emotion or subjective judgment;
it is an objective judgment based on the person's deeds that reflect the
values the person possesses, such as character, goodness, reputation,
trustfulness and so on. In other words, dignity is a social concept. Dignity
derives from a person's individual values. This is why it should be
protected. Because of this individual orientation, if a comment or writing
violates dignity, this violation must be directed to certain individual(s)
(including institutions), and the comment or writing must include concrete
factors to lower the social status of that person or create the obvious
situation that lowers it.
Given the situation in which this comment was made, it is likely
Nagano merely expressed that which he thought to be the general
understanding of the issue. Certainly, considering the report by the Foreign
Affairs Section of the Cabinet, the truth of the comment remains in
question. Furthermore, given his status as Minister of Justice and as major
representative of the Defendant in this case, the appropriateness of the
comment is suspect. However, it is clear that it was not directed at any
individual, nor at the Plaintiffs in this trial.
c) Hence, the court does not recognize that the comment by former
Minister of Justice Nagano has violated the dignity of the Plaintiffs and,
even without considering the rest of the appeal, there is no legal ground for
the Plaintiffs' compensation demand.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The court accepts the appeal by the "Comfort Women" Plaintiffs23
insofar as they receive 300 thousand yen plus five percent interest from
September 1, 1992, until payment is complete. The rest of their appeal and
the appeal by the Teishintai Plaintiffs24 lack legal basis and therefore are
dismissed. As for the litigation fees, in accordance with Article 61, Article
64 and Article 65 of the Civil Law-Suit Act, the court has already stated its
orders in the main text.
Yamaguchi Lower-court, Shimonoseki Branch, Section 1.
Presiding Judge Hideaki Konoshita, Judge Masato Morinuki and Judge
Makoto Uedera have been transferred and are unable to sign. Signed by
Presiding Judge Konoshita Hideaki
23 Plaintiff Ha Sun-nyo, Plaintiff Park Tu-ri and Plaintiff Lee Sun-dok.
24 Plaintiffs Yu Chan-i, Park So-duk, Park Sun-bok, Lee Yong-son, Kang Yong-jyu, Chong Su-ryon
and Yang Kun-dok.
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